Abstract-In web authentication, the many password alternatives proposed over the years, despite having different designs and objectives, all predominantly rely on an element of secrecy. This motivates us, herein, to provide the first detailed exploration of the integration of a fundamentally different element of defense into the design of web authentication schemes: a mimicry resistance dimension. We analyze web authentication mechanisms with respect to new properties related to mimicry-resistance, and in particular evaluate invisible techniques that provide some mimicry-resistance (unlike those relying solely on static secrets), including device fingerprinting schemes, PUFs (physically unclonable functions), and a subset of Internet geolocation mechanisms.
Introduction
None of the many schemes proposed over the years to replace passwords have offered sufficient usability and deployability benefits to displace passwords at the Internet scale [1] . Since passwords do not seem to be disappearing [2] , a prominent avenue of improvement is to reinforce their security by parallel mechanisms [3] without further burdening users.
A challenge in providing sufficient security guarantees for web authentication, i.e., user-to-web and deviceto-web (versus user-to-device), is that the security of many schemes, including those relying on somethingyou-have or something-you-are, requires the ability to protect a secret. For example, a physical biometric such as a fingerprint can be captured in transit and replayed by an attacker without physical possession of the fingerprint, resulting in security properties similar to other stored secrets such as passwords. The reliance of many schemes on an element of secrecy is reflected in the Usability-Deployability-Security (UDS) evaluation framework [1] , where eight of nine security properties assess a scheme's resilience against the exposure of a secret.
. Version: August 8, 2017 We revisit the process of compromising an account from an attacker's perspective, now viewing it as a two stage process involving both exposure and mimicry. Exposure refers to the capture of information that enables account access, such as a password, session cookie, or a cryptographic key; mimicry refers to actions performed by the attacker to impersonate the legitimate user's behavior, such as replaying a password or spoofing a user's geographic location (i.e., in location-based authentication [4] ). Accordingly, a scheme's authentication token may resist attacks by both: resisting exposure and resisting mimicry. 1 We investigate the little-studied mimicry-resistance dimension in web authentication, ranking schemes across a continuum of three classes of resistance to mimicry, as detailed in Section 3. Mimicryresistant authentication schemes have been proposed to displace password authentication in the user-to-device context (see, e.g., analysis of mimicry attacks on userto-device authentication [6] ). In contrast, upon our analysis herein of user-to-web authentication schemes, including those previously evaluated by Bonneau et al. [1, p.11] under the UDS framework, we find that most offer litle to no resistance to mimicry.
To construct a more comprehensive evaluation framework for authentication schemes, we augment the existing UDS security properties, which concentrate on exposure-resistance, with new properties measuring mimicry-resistance. We leverage the UDS framework security properties to systematically rate authentication schemes across an additional continuum ranging from lowest to highest resistance to exposure, and use these as orthogonal axes (exposure and mimicry) to plot a two-dimensional chart. Along both dimensions, our evaluation also reflects the scalability of attacks required to defeat a scheme.
The lack of mimicry-resistant schemes among those previously evaluated under UDS [1] motivates us to evaluate distinct techniques to reinforce web authentication, including device fingerprinting (FP) [7] , Internet geolocation [8] , Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) [9] , 1. The term mimicry has been used in the context of intrusion detection systems, referring to the attacker's ability to mimic legitimate traffic [5] . We use the term in the web authentication context. and One Time Passwords (OTPs) [10] ; some variations of these offer resistance to mimicry attacks, and/or are also invisible, in that they do not require any user effort to configure or use (see Section 2) . We supplement the UDS framework with two usability properties and four security properties (Table 2) . Under this revised framework, we evaluate the four aforementioned techniques when combined with passwords, and find that invisible and mimicry-resistant schemes combined with passwords provide significantly higher resistance to attack. This constitutes an initial step towards identifying mimicry-resistant web authentication schemes that can enhance security with minimal usability penalties. In summary, the following contributions are made:
• Investigating the mimicry-resistance dimension in web authentication, including ranking schemes under three sub-classes of mimicry resistance.
• Exploring newer invisible techniques, and evaluating their degree of mimicry resistance when used for web authentication.
• Constructing a comprehensive evaluation framework including: a two-dimensional chart combining the exposure and mimicry resistance dimensions, to visually reflect the ability of a scheme to resist scalable attacks; an augmented UDS framework; and its use herein for the first detailed exploration of the benefits of combining mimicry-resistant web authentication techniques with ubiquitous passwordbased user-to-web authentication. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background. Section 3 introduces the mimicry-resistance dimension in web authentication, and plots a representative subset of authentication schemes onto an Exposure-Mimicry twodimensional space. Section 4 evaluates relatively littleexplored schemes found to have mimicry resistance, using a modified UDS framework [1] with new properties addressing the mimicry resistance dimension. Section 5 concludes.
Background and Context
We briefly review background on forms of authentication ( Fig. 1) , and related work evaluating authentication schemes.
The standard process whereby a web server asks a user to input a password through a web interface, which gets transmitted over the Internet for the web server to verify, is user-to-web (see Fig. 1 ), even though the password was physically entered into the user's local device. The device is a passive token conveyor, and does no checking on behalf of the web server. In contrast, when a user authenticates to their smartphone, it is userto-device. Some authentication schemes that appear to be user-to-web actually combine user-to-device authentication and device-to-web authentication; for example, a mobile payment app may authenticate the user via a Figure 1 . A comparison between user-to-device, device-to-web, and user-to-web (directly).
biometric (e.g., fingerprint or iris scan), which unlocks a locally-stored cryptographic key used by the mobile device to authenticate to the remote server.
Implicit vs. invisible authentication. Implicit authentication [11] encompasses a class of user-to-device schemes whose design focuses on reducing user burden, e.g., by transparently measuring a user's biometric attributes or physiological behaviors, and using those for authentication, requiring no user involvement at login time. Many such user-to-device schemes have been proposed; their accuracy and the ability of some of these to resist mimicry attacks has been evaluated [6] . In contrast, herein we consider web authentication schemes, thus focusing on user-to-web and device-to-web authentication.
We also make the distinction between implicit schemes and invisible ones; the former generally refers to user-to-device schemes that authenticate the user based on their behaviour as measured through various sensors (e.g., accelerometer, swipe patterns), and we define the latter as device-to-web schemes that require no user involvement neither during set-up nor login. Note that not all device-to-web schemes are invisible, as some require a user to carry out an action; for example, to fingerprint the accelerometer while at rest [12] , the user may need to place the device on a flat surface. Two-factor vs. two-element authentication. We distinguish the previously mentioned example of a mobile payment app from two-factor authentication. From a user's perspective, the app only requires a single (biometric) authentication factor (i.e., single user effort). This is also true from an attacker's perspectiveforging the user's biometric is sufficient to gain access. However, since such schemes consist of distinct userto-device and device-to-web authentication components, we call them two-element authentication. Another twoelement example would be an app using a cryptographic key to authenticate to the remote web server, with the key encrypted with a password-derived key.
Two-factor authentication, as used by Google since 2011 [13] , uses a password in combination with a 6-digit code provided to the user over a separate channel (i.e., their mobile device). Thus, the web server validates two independent credentials.
The Mimicry Resistance Dimension
Authenticating a user typically relies on: somethingyou-know (i.e., some secret the user knows), somethingyou-have, or something-you-are. Implementations of biometric-based user-to-web authentication mechanisms (i.e., something-you-are) often reduce to somethingyou-know since data is often stored in the form of strings treated as the secret. This is usually due to the problem that the transmission path from the sensor (e.g., biometric fingerprint reader) to the authentication server is typically untrusted, or at least less so than the path from the sensor to the authenticating application in user-to-device authentication. It is often the case that exposing these strings/secrets through, e.g., guessing or capture, defeats authentication and thus, both something-you-know and something-you-are web authentication schemes often provide no resistance to mimicry.
For something-you-have, authenticating a user by verifying possession of a hardware token 2 requires another "sub-authentication": authenticating the hardware token itself. Such tokens are generally electronic devices (e.g., a USB OTP token or smartphone), which can be authenticated using, e.g., cryptographic techniques.
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Because authenticating these tokens will almost always involve secrets, something-you-have often boils down to a something-you-know, i.e., something you, the token, knows. Most known variations of hardware authenticating tokens are defeated once that secret is exposed [1] , e.g., by capture or theft, again providing little to no resistance to mimicry.
The Exposure-Mimicry Duality
Defeating a web authentication scheme typically requires two actions: exposing a token and mimicking certain behavior. That behavior is any action the legitimate user (or device) normally performs while authenticating to a service; for passwords, that behavior is trivially mimicked by simply replaying a static password. A scheme's resistance to compromise thus depends on its ability to independently resist exposure and mimicry. To evaluate a scheme's resistance across these orthogonal components, we construct a two-dimensional space in Fig.2 and plot various web authentication schemes on it. A marker (i.e., dot) represents a scheme's authentication token. Height along the y-axis indicates resilience to exposure; distance right along the x-axis indicates resilience to mimicry. Fig.2 is split into three segments: V1-Negligible-resistance (i.e., guessable), V2-Guess-resistant, and V3-Leak-resistant. Guessing a credential is the easiest exposure. Digital theft (leak henceforth) is generally easier than physical 2. We use the terms token (by default indicating a digital token) and credential interchangeably. Hardware tokens will be explicitly identified.
Vertical axis. The y-axis of
3. Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) do not hide a key, but still have a component that may be exposed albeit harder to reproduce/mimic. See Section 3.2.4 for further discussion. theft in that (1) leaks can often be arranged at scale, e.g., by phishing, and (2) leaks can be by remote access, e.g., a public authentication-server on the Internet is subject to attack from anywhere in the world (an adversary need not be in physical proximity).
V1. Within the lowest vertical-axis segment, a credential requiring more guesses is placed higher. The guessability of a scheme's credential may depend on several factors. A very weak password for example could be easier to guess than a strong PIN. Thus, schemes are placed according to commonly perceived strength in a typical scenario. Guessing in that segment also addresses generic guessing strategies for trawling attacks (capturing as many accounts as possible, often by guessing the most common password across all accounts, then moving down a list of candidate passwords). Educated guesses in targeted attacks are a special threat model unsuitable for trawling attacks, and are thus not placed in this segment (see V3 below).
V2. The middle vertical-axis segment comprises schemes with components impractical to guess, such as cryptographic keys or randomly-generated passwords with sufficient length to withstand offline guessing attacks. Those may still be leaked (e.g., client-side malware). We consider within this segment four sub-levels, based on the number of sources where leakage may occur: the human user, the browser, the client's device (e.g., tablet or smartphone), and a public server whose compromise defeats authentication; e.g., a trusted third party of the main authentication server, or a party that also stores the same credential (e.g., a same password used across multiple websites). A scheme subject to leaks from all four sources is placed at the lowest of V2's four sub-levels; one subject to leaks from any three of the four places it second-lowest, and so on. A scheme not subject to leaks from any of these four sources is placed in V3.
V3. Schemes in the upper vertical segment are those resilient to exposure by digital theft-thus mostly physical tokens of some sort. These are prone to targeted attack, most commonly physical theft, requiring physical proximity to the target user. A scheme's vertical position within V3 varies with vulnerability to theft. A smartphone for example, relatively small in size and carried around more often, is easier to steal than a desktop PCthe latter may require physical break-in to an office and effort to cover the escape.
Sorting rationale. The intuition behind arranging the three segments in the above manner follows logically from scenarios of trawling attacks. Assuming, for example, that a website does not throttle online password guessing, a good attack strategy is to try guessing passwords. If online guessing fails, an attacker often moves to digital theft (V2 segment on Fig.2 guessed and often also captured, 4 and are rated lower in resistance to exposure. If all forms of leaks (digital theft) fail, the attacker is left with physically stealing, e.g., a smartphone or hardware authentication token. These attacks also become gradually harder to scale (for an adversary) in the aforementioned order.
Relationship to UDS framework. As summarized in Table 1 , the vertical axis in Fig.2 addresses the S (Security) benefits in the UDS framework, excluding the two privacy properties: Unlinkable and RequiringExplicit-Consent. 5 The UDS framework did not intend to provide an overall summary rating for a scheme. In contrast, we use our sorting rationale (as discussed above) in conjunction with the UDS security benefits to rate a scheme's overall resistance to exposure; for example, if a scheme only fails to provide Resilient-toUnthrottled-Guessing but provides the remaining eight security properties, it is placed near the bottom of 4 . An example where a password can be guessed but not leaked is in challenge-response schemes where the password is never typed on the keyboard nor stored anywhere (neither on the server nor any client device), such that the user computes the response from the challenge in their head, or offline using a calculator. That would be resilient to phishing, theft, malware, leaks from verifiers, requires no trusted third parties, and possibly physical observation.
5. Requiring-Explicit-Consent can in some cases have a security aspect, e.g., preventing a malicious RFID-based card reader embedded in a sofa from authorizing a transaction without user knowledge [1] . [1] evaluate schemes by susceptibility to exposure. This table lists the properties a scheme must achieve to move to the next-higher vertical segment in Fig.2 , e.g., both S3 and S4 must be achieved to be placed in V2.
UDS Security Property
Lower (V1) S4. Resilient-to-Unthrottled-Guessing * Additional third parties increase chances of leaks from public servers. From the adversary's perspective, this property becomes similar to Leaks-from-Other-Verifiers. See inline for details.
the vertical axis within V1 (despite having a virtually full row of security bullets). Passwords fail to provide Resilient-to-Throttled-Guessing and Resilientto-Unthrottled-Guessing benefits, which correspond to V1, yet get a full bullet [1] in Resilient-to-Physical-Theft, which corresponds to our highest exposure resistance category (segment V3).
To place a scheme onto the vertical axis using its security benefits as assessed by the UDS authors [1] , start from the weakest category of exposure resistance: guessing. If a scheme does not provide both S3 and S4 (Table 1) , place it within V1. For a scheme providing both S3 and S4: if it provides all of S1, S5-7, and S9, place it within V3; otherwise, place it within V2. Example scheme placements are discussed in Section 3.2.
Note that S2 (Resilient-to-Targeted-Impersonation) represents a wide spectrum of targeted attacks including, e.g., deceiving a human acting as a trusted party as in social re-auth [14] , educated guesses, or actions requiring physical proximity such as lifting fingerprints off a doorknob [1] . The success of these attacks thus requires an attacker in physical or logical proximity (e.g., social engineering attacks against social re-auth to the victim). This is similar to physical theft and thus, although examples of targeted impersonation include educated guesses, schemes resilient to general guessing attacks are placed above V1 (even if not resilient to educated guessing attacks).
Horizontal axis.
The x-axis (Mimicry Resistance) reflects burdens on the attacker to mimic the verifier-expected behavior, after exposing a scheme's credential. Unfortunately, the security of most authentication schemes proposed to date rely on some form of resisting exposure, with compromise complete once the underlying secret token is revealed. This includes passwords, user-to-web physical biometrics (see Section 2), and poorly managed/generated private keys [15] . If leaking a credential does not allow an attacker access by directly replaying the credential, the scheme exhibits some degree of mimicry resistance, and gains horizontal depth on Fig.2 .
We split the horizontal axis into three segments: H1-Negligible-resistance (i.e., simply replayable), H2-Replay-resistant, and H3-Spoof-resistant.
H1. If an attacker can simply submit or replay a credential after exposing it, the scheme provides no resistance to replay and thus gains no horizontal depth (i.e., does not move to the right, away from the origin) along the Mimicry Resistance dimension. For example, replaying a captured password is trivial; thus, passwords gain no horizontal depth; see Fig.2 .
In some cases, there is no clear-cut answer as to whether exposing information directly helps the attacker gain access. For example, answers to personal knowledge questions that are based on recent account activity (e.g., who was the last person you emailed?) likely remain unchanged for a few hours. Capturing an answer allows the attacker to login only within that window. Such schemes are given some horizontal depth, but remain within H1. Another example is password expiration policies [16] , [17] forcing resets every, e.g., one hour, which would provide some mimicry resistance (albeit highly unusable), and placed within H1 on Fig.2 .
Some challenge-response schemes are also candidates for H1; whether or not a captured response directly allows the attacker to compromise the account is conditional on whether the captured response remains valid. Schemes where the set of challenge-response pairs is finite and relatively small, or when capturing a handful of challenge-responses suffices for defeating authentication, would thus fall within H1. Cognitive schemes, like Weinshall [18] , and challenge-response-based graphical passwords, like Persuasive Cued Click Points [19] , are prominent examples. Other challenge-response schemes are placed in H2.
H2. After a credential is leaked, schemes that either require additional attacker actions beyond simply replaying a string or conducting a straightforward operation (e.g., cryptographic signing), or where the time window of conducting these simple actions is relatively short (e.g., < 2 mins) with respect to attack scalability, are considered replay-resistant and placed within H2. An example scheme is DNS resolver fingerprinting (FP5 in Fig.2) , which determines the DNS resolver used by the client (see Section 3.2.2); knowing the resolver's address is insufficient to defeat authentication, as the attacker must also be able to use it to resolve domain names.
One-time password (OTP) over SMS is another example scheme placed within H2, as it enables the attacker to compromise the account only if the user hasn't already used the OTP. The attacker may capture the OTP in clear text [20] and use it before the legitimate (victim) user. Additionally, the server may set a 2-minute time window where an OTP token is valid for usage, and expires afterwards. Such schemes would be placed within H2 on Fig.2. H3. Spoofing is a form of mimicry, but describes attacks harder than simply replay. We place within segment H3 any scheme that requires additional equipment and/or systems (e.g., hardware chip manufacturers, or large scale distributed botnets) to mimic the behavior that the server measures and expects from the legitimate user. An example is robust location verification (see L4 in Section 3.2.1).
Because certain phenomena (e.g., a user behavior or habit) are measured in spoof-resistant schemes, the measurement process typically allows some degree of tolerance to account for (1) imperfections in the measuring apparatus, or (2) the phenomena's natural instability over time.
For (1), consider for example a location-based authentication scheme, where a web server grants access to a user only if the user is at an expected geographic location. Ideally, the user's location would be identified to such a high granularity that no two human beings could exist at the same {latitude, longitude, altitude} coordinates. This however is infeasible since no known technology exists that could remotely and securely measure location with such accuracy.
For (2), again using location-based authentication as an example, a user's daily geographic commute from one place to another (e.g., work to home) makes it impractical to grant account access only if the user is geographically present in, e.g., a 1 m 2 area, even if technology allowing such high accuracy geolocation existed. Geolocating users to a city-level would thus seem a more suitable granularity to be practical for generic locationbased authentication purposes.
The degree of fuzziness introduced while measuring a user's behavior in spoof-resistant schemes is thus likely to result in false accepts, i.e., falsely accepting another user as the intended one. In practice, some websites use IP-address based location look-ups [21] to implement location-aware authentication, which returns locations at the city or state level. Thus, all attackers physically present in the user's city (or even a legitimate user mistyping the username with no malicious intent) are falsely accepted.
Note that a scheme's susceptibility to false accepts is different from its ability to resist spoofing; the latter is represented by the Mimicry Resistance dimension of Fig.2 . A highly accurate geolocation mechanism such as GPS may be subject to spoofing. Following our above definition of false accepts, granting account access to an attacker who has simply forged its GPS coordinates as they are being submitted to the authentication server is not considered a false accept. This is rather an artifact of the scheme's poor resistance to spoofing and hence, GPS gains no depth along the Mimicry Resistance dimension on Fig.2 .
False accepts are not directly represented by the Mimicry-Resistant dimension (though we capture them in the evaluation framework in Section 4). They are indirectly captured however by a scheme's position vertically. This is because resilience to guessing attacks and resilience to false accepts are both related to the size and distribution of the credential space.
Scheme Placement on Fig.2
We use the mapping method of Section 3.1.1 (under "Relationship to UDS framework") to position a representative subset of schemes along the exposureresistance dimension using their previously assessed (in [1, p.11]) security benefits. Upon evaluating their mimicry-resistance ability, we find most schemes offer little to no resistance to mimicry (i.e., lie essentially on the vertical axis)-see Fig.2 .
We thus explore and discuss example schemes which do provide certain mimicry-resistance, and position them along the two axes. To avoid redundancy, we only explain the horizontal position of these schemes in this section; for their vertical position, see Section 4.
Geolocation (selected methods).
We review four broad classes of Internet geolocation techniques to be used for location-based authentication, placing a marker for each class on Fig.2 to rate their ability to resist compromise. A typical location-based authentication process involves a server storing the user's expected location in some format (city-level, nation/state level, or latitude/longitude coordinates) depending on the employed geolocation class, with locations stored in plain text, hashed, or cloaked [22] to a certain degree to preserve users' privacy. To process a login request, a server uses any of the four classes below to obtain/verify the user's current location in realtime, and grants access if the location matches the expected one.
L1: GPS and WPS. GPS and WiFi Positioning System (WPS) are geolocation techniques commonly used in practice. WPS uses multi-lateration based on the signal strengths between the device and nearby WiFi access points with known locations. These techniques are usually selected by the user's browser in the W3C geolocation API [23] , whereby the browser obtains the coordinates from the device's GPS driver, or from a location provider after submitting a list of nearby WiFi access points and their signal strengths to the location provider. L1 gains no depth across the Mimicry Resistance dimension (see Fig.2 ), since techniques rely on browser-reported information that can be substituted and replayed by an attacker, so knowledge of the user's location is sufficient to break authentication.
L2: IP-address based tabulation. Tabulationbased geolocation service providers such as Maxmind 6 and ipinfo 7 maintain lookup tables, which map IP address blocks to cities and countries, possibly through publicly available information such as IP address registries (e.g., whois 8 ) and the geography of IP address al- [21] , and evadable through use of middleboxes and virtual private networks (VPNs) [24] . L2 is rated slightly more resilient to compromise than forgable GPS/WPS coordinates, and is placed within H2; it is not in H3 since even an attacker unable to forge source IP addresses may use public HTTP proxies or bots in close proximity to the user. L3: Measurement-based geolocation. In this class, network measurements, such as Round-Trip Times (RTTs), are conducted from a set of landmarks (e.g., cloud-based or CDN servers) to the target user, and are then mapped to geographic distances using a precalibrated delay-to-distance function. The user's location is estimated through multi-lateration, relative to the landmarks' locations. Examples include Spotter [25] and CBG [26] . Other proposals suggested mapping the network topology for higher accuracy [27] . To date, measurement-based geolocation can achieve an accuracy on the order of a few tens of meters. Manipulating L3 requires more advanced techniques than simply submitting forged coordinates, but can be spoofed with enough knowledge of the network topology and the landmarks/verifiers being used [28] , [29] ; they are limited to H2.
L4: Robust location verification. Some techniques verify the outcomes of Internet geolocation techniques, and/or are designed to be resilient to common adversarial manipulation tactics. The result of a preliminary geolocation is treated as an asserted location (analogous to a username asserting identity), to be verified by a measurement-based proof (analogous to proof of knowledge of a secret). Examples schemes include Client Presence Verification (CPV) [30] (see Section 4) and Trusted Platform Module (TPM)-supported GPS drivers [31] ; the former cryptographically protects network delay measurements used for verifying location assertions, and the latter communicates coordinates securely. We call such techniques robust location verification and rate them as spoof-resistant (H3) because manipulation requires attackers to expend more effort than simply reporting a false location; successfully spoofing legitimate client locations requires using specialized proxy machines or GPS satellite signal-spoofing devices [32] .
Device Fingerprinting.
Device fingerprinting refers to techniques by which a server collects information on a device's hardware/software configuration for the purpose of identification [7] . From 29 methods recently surveyed [33] , we extract six categories for evaluation.
FP1: System parameters/preferences. This class includes software and hardware information about the device to be authenticated, provided by the web browser's JavaScript API (e.g., the navigator and windows JavaScript BOM objects), such as operating system version, screen resolution, time zone, system language, and supported WebGL capabilities. FP1 lies on the y-axis, since it can simply be mimicked by replaying the information.
FP2: Audio and canvas challenge/response. This class includes two techniques that fingerprint the client's graphics and audio subsystems, respectively. HTML5 canvas fingerprinting renders a variety of text and graphics in an HTML5 canvas on the client's browser, which results in subtly different images (e.g., due to differences in anti-aliasing or font smoothing) depending on the graphics driver and hardware on the device being fingerprinted. Audio processing fingerprinting leverages the HTML AudioContext API that provides real-time frequency-and time-domain analysis of audio playback, mainly used for creating audio visualizations. Playing the same sound on different devices results in subtly different waveforms, depending on the sound driver and hardware. To improve resistance to replay attacks, these two techniques can be used in a challengeresponse scheme, where the server can store the client's responses to many different challenges [34] , and are thus placed within H2.
FP3: Hardware sensors. This class, suitable to fingerprint smartphones, leverages the inherent variation in the manufacturing and factory calibration of typical smartphone sensors, such as accelerometer and speakermicrophone systems. Similar to FP1, FP3 lies on the y-axis since information can simply be replayed.
FP4: Clock skew. The server uses TCP timestamps to measure the clock skew of the device being fingerprinted, which differs across devices due to manufacturing variation. FP4 is placed within H3, since clock skew spoofing attacks are highly sophisticated; e.g., Arackaparambil et al. show how timestamp manipulation can be detected by a server [35] .
FP5: DNS resolver. The server determines a client's DNS resolver(s) by presenting the client a page that contains a reference to a randomly-generated (nonexistent) subdomain, triggering a client DNS lookup; as a result the server will receive a DNS query from the client's resolver. The DNS resolver serves as a fingerprint. FP5 provides partial replay-resistance but can be defeated via the use of proxies, similar to L2. In some cases, organizations run their own DNS servers, which resolve domain names only to machines within the department's network. To spoof a victim's DNS resolver, an attacker would need to be able to resolve domain names using the organization's private DNS server. Since identifying the server is not enough (and is easier than using the organization's DNS), FP5 is placed within H2.
FP6: Protocol-based fingerprinting. This class includes schemes that glean information from network-, transport-, and application-layer protocol fields. For example, the TLS library of the client device can be fingerprinted using the Client Hello packet received during the handshake sequence, which includes information such as the device's supported TLS version, supported ciphersuites (and their order of presentation), compression options, and list of supported extensions (along with associated parameters such as elliptic curve parameters). FP6 lies within H1, since it is susceptible to mimicry, but attacks are less scalable than simply replaying a static string; OS-or library-level modifications may be required.
OTP Schemes.
One-time password (OTP) schemes generate short-lived credentials, often used as a second factor alongside conventional passwords. Depending on implementation (four follow), an attacker may aim to capture either the seed or a challengeresponse pair.
OTP1: OTP mobile apps. This class (e.g., Google Authenticator) generates OTPs to be manually typed into a user's access device, using a combination of a locally-stored shared secret and either the current time (TOTP [10] ) or a counter (HOTP [36] ). With malware on the device, the attacker can capture the locally-stored shared secret; because this directly enables the attacker to compromise the account, OTP1 provides no resistance to mimicry, and is placed on the vertical axis of Fig.2 .
OTP2: OTP USB tokens. This class (e.g., FIDO U2F keys [37] ) is similar to OTP1, but require less effort since the user can press a button on the token to automatically enter the OTP into a browser window. Assuming hardware tokens can resist malware, it becomes relatively challenging for an attacker to capture challenge-response pairs. Similar to OTP1, the attacker can thus target the seed, i.e., hardware token theft. This gives the attacker direct account compromise, gaining no horizontal depth.
OTP3: SMS OTP. The server sends a randomlygenerated OTP (i.e., no reliance on a shared secret/seed) to the user via SMS. Contrary to the previous two OTP classes, the seed here is only stored on the server, which makes it harder to capture. The attacker can however capture an OTP in transit, e.g., by exploring weaknesses in the cellular network [20] , but will be required to replay it rapidly before it expires. The short time window that attacker gets gains OTP3 horizontal depth, placing it within H2 on Fig.2 .
OTP4: E-mail OTP. The server sends a randomlygenerated OTP (again no reliance on a shared secret/seed) to the user via e-mail. Because an attacker can capture an OTP, e.g., via malware on the user's machine, its mimicry-resistance is similar to OTP3.
PUFs. Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs)
are hardware modules (typically manufactured into silicon-based chips) that leverage an underlying unique physical structure to act as a one-way function; ideal PUFs are impossible to clone, since the unique structure of each individual PUF results from manufacturing variation [9] . For our evaluation herein, we assume the use of PUFs that are built into the user's device (as opposed to, e.g., a USB-based token). PUF1: Strong PUFs. These theoretically generate an endless supply of challenge-response pairs, which are stored server-side to verify authentication. Current PUFs do not meet the strict criteria of PUF1, due to challenges such as susceptibility to model-building attacks [38] . PUF1 lies on the y-axis-the only security property it lacks from Table 1 is Resilient-to-PhysicalTheft; because theft of a PUF1 device allows an attacker to directly impersonate the user (i.e., defeats authentication), they offer no mimicry-resistance.
PUF2: Weak PUFs. These can only generate a limited number of challenge-response pairs. They are suitable for use in a number of applications when augmented with appropriate mechanisms, e.g., when restricted to only responding to challenges sent from a single trusted verifier over an authenticated channel [9] ; this limits an attacker's ability to capture challenge/response pairs and build a model of the PUF sufficient for a mimicry attack. PUF devices are commercially available, e.g., for device authentication and cryptographic key storage [39] . PUF2 is placed within H2-it lacks Resilient-to-Internal-Observation from Table 1 , but a successful mimicry attack can be mounted by building a mathematical model of the PUF only after capturing a sufficient number of challenge/response pairs (e.g., via man-in-the-middle). Figure 2 illustrates the relative resilience of schemes with respect to a trawling attack, i.e., attacks that try to break into as many accounts as possible. Attack scalability is relative to the attacks that apply to each of the horizontal and vertical axes as now explained. Schemes closer to the origin are subject to more scalable attacks, and therefore more susceptible to having many accounts compromised easily. Along the vertical axis, schemes vulnerable to scalable attacks are those where the attacker can guess user credentials (V1). Attacks against schemes that require information theft (e.g., via software vulnerabilities or social engineering) are less scalable (V2), and schemes that require physical theft (V3) are least vulnerable to scalable attacks. Similarly along the Mimicry Resistance axis, attacks against schemes where an exposed secret can be replayed as-is are most scalable; attack scalability decreases for schemes that increase the attacker burden (in terms of hardware costs or control of network infrastructure) for mimicking account-holders beyond a simple replay attack.
Interpreting Attack Scalability

Further Insights
We briefly discuss further insights from Fig.2 . Multi-factor authentication. We use the chart to evaluate individual authentication schemes, and refrain from rating multi-factor authentication (e.g., OTPs are evaluated as if used independently) because the chart, although covering two fundamental security components, reflects neither usability nor deployability aspects. Nonetheless, it could be of independent interest to visualize security gains when combining schemes; the marker's (x,y) position of any resultant (combined) scheme would be the larger of both x-values and both y-values.
Square semantics. None of the schemes analyzed have strong resistance to both mimicry and exposuresee the three empty squares in the top-right (H2V3, H3V2, H3V3). Schemes in this region would strongly resist scalable attacks.
Bands versus markers. Instead of marker representation, schemes on Fig.2 could also be represented using bands. For example, passwords could be represented by a vertically standing band from V1 (guessable passwords) to somewhere in V2 (resilient to guessing attacks, but still subject to leaks). The band representation can also help identify how various implementations of a scheme may degrade security. We chose the simpler representation as it is easier to interpret, and to avoid cluttering the chart with intersecting bands.
Comparative Evaluation
In Table 2 , we evaluate two classes of invisible authentication schemes, namely geolocation and device fingerprinting, based on the 25 usability, deployability, and security properties (benefits) of the UDS framework [1] , which we augment with six additional benefits relevant to schemes that are invisible and have mimicry-resistance. The original UDS properties (see Appendix A) and our new properties defined below are italicized when referenced herein. The new properties are as follows:
U9. No-False-Rejects is a usability benefit concerning authentication failures resulting from system error (e.g., due to measurement error). False rejects arise due to fuzzy or non-binary matching functions often employed by invisible authentication schemes. This differs from Infrequent-Errors (U7), wherein authentication may fail due to user action (e.g., incorrectly typing a password) or attempts to authenticate under unusual circumstances (e.g., from unexpected locations).
U10. Easy-to-Change-Credentials is a usability benefit for schemes where a user may easily change credentials (e.g., in event of a server database leak). In contrast, Easy-Recovery-From-Loss (U8) reflects how easily a user can recover from a credential loss (e.g., forgotten password). Credential loss requires a fallback mechanism to verify the user's identity; changing credentials does not, since the user remains in possession of valid credentials. Easy-to-Change-Credentials is inherent to the authentication mechanism itself, whereas EasyRecovery-From-Loss may depend also on the fallback mechanism.
M1. No-False-Accepts is a security benefit of schemes that have a sufficiently large credential space and/or measurement precision such that the server will always be able to distinguish the legitimate user from an unauthorized one. False accepts may include both non-malicious users and attackers mistaken for legitimate users, e.g., due to close proximity in a geolocation scheme, or a device fingerprint similar (within the margin of error) to that of a legitimate user. False accepts exclude attacks on the integrity of the authentication system (these are covered by the rest of the security properties), such as manipulating delay measurements to spoof a location or tampering with client-side code to spoof a device fingerprint. For example, a location-based scheme lacks this benefit if it is susceptible to colocation attacks, i.e., where the attacker travels and colocates himself with the user in a highly targeted attack.
M2. Resilient-to-Delayed-Replay is a security benefit of schemes in which credentials are not static, but change relatively slowly, e.g., personal knowledge questions based on the user's account activity, such as recent transactions. Such credentials, when compromised, limit the duration for which the attacker retains account access.
M3. Resilient-to-Immediate-Replay is a security benefit of challenge-response based schemes where the server issues a new challenge per authentication; thus an attack fails if simply capturing and replaying a static string. OTP schemes have this property, since the credentials expire within a short time frame (e.g., 2 minutes) or upon use, thereby substantially limiting the window for replay.
M4. Resilient-to-Spoofing is a security benefit of schemes that leverage measurement techniques (e.g., hardware or network-based) that are impractical for an attacker to defeat at scale. For example, CPV is Resilient-to-Spoofing, since the measurements cannot be manipulated to make an attacker appear to be in a different location (i.e., that of the victim user). Table 2 cells corresponding to benefits M2, M3, and M4 are populated based on a scheme's positioning along the H1, H2, and H3 segments respectively in Fig.2 , as discussed in Section 3.2. The following subsections evaluate the schemes with respect to the remaining benefits.
Impact of Account Recovery on Security
In practice, authentication schemes are paired with backup mechanisms to help users recover account access if they lose their credentials. The recovery mechanism should not be easier to defeat than the primary scheme, but may sacrifice usability since it is used less frequently.
For conventional password-based authentication, email based password reset is the standard recovery mechanism. Its security relies on the implicit assumption that the user's e-mail account is at least as well-secured as any systems that rely on it for password reset. It is ideally expected that users choose a stronger password for primary e-mail accounts; security-conscious users may also use two-factor authentication. E-mail based recovery can also be used for the geolocation and device fingerprinting schemes evaluated herein; alternatives such as SMS-based OTP are also suitable. For example, in a geolocation-based scheme, a user wishing to sign in from a new location could be e-mailed a link through which they could confirm their new location. Table 2 summarizes our evaluation of several categories of schemes including geolocation, device fingerprinting, and PUFs as both stand-alone authentication schemes and in combination with passwords, based on the augmented UDS criteria from Section 4. Password authentication is included as reference; OTP schemes are included as they are widely used in combination with passwords. We also include Sound-Proof [40] , a recently proposed two-factor authentication as an additional example scheme that also provides some mimicry resistance. Each row in the table corresponds to an authentication scheme, and each column to a benefit; a cell with a bullet represents a benefit offered by the scheme, an empty circle represents a benefit partially provided, and an empty cell indicates that the benefit is not provided.
Evaluation of Schemes
Web Passwords. For the new properties, web passwords provide
No-False-Rejects since a correctlytyped password will never be rejected, Easy-to-ChangeCredentials since passwords can be easily changed, and No-False-Accepts since an exact match is required. However, passwords lack Resilient-to-DelayedReplay, Resilient-to-Immediate-Replay and Resilient-toSpoofing, since it is trivial to replay a captured password. Table 2 are invisible to the user, they provide most of the usability benefits. L3 (measurement-based) and L4 (location verification) may sometimes take longer than conventionally considered convenient, thus providing only a partial Efficient-to-Use benefit. Additionally, all but L1 (GPS/WPS) may miscalculate the location and falsely reject users in some cases, and therefore do not fulfill NoFalse-Rejects. Although L1 (GPS/WPS) may sometimes result in a small error in location calculation, the calculated location will generally remain in the same city, and thus gets a bullet. None of L1-L4 are Easy-to-ChangeCredentials, since changing credentials would require the legitimate user to change their location.
Location-based Schemes. Since L1-L4 in
For deployability, all of L1-L4 are Accessible; they do not require any explicit user action. They are NegligibleCost-Per-User, since the infrastructure expense is independent from the number of users being served. They lack Server-Compatible as they require serverside changes, but are Browser-Compatible (no client-side changes needed). L3 is partially Mature since there are indications that it is being used in practice [41] ; L4 is TABLE 2. Evaluation of geolocation, device fingerprinting, OTP, and PUF schemes both as stand-alone authentication schemes and as combined mechanisms with passwords. Password authentication is included as reference; OTP schemes are included as they are widely used in combination with passwords; Sound-Proof [40] is included as another example of a two-factor scheme that also provides some mimicry resistance.
• denotes the scheme provides the corresponding benefit (column); • denotes partial benefit; an empty cell denotes absence of benefit. ** denotes additional properties introduced herein. Party is provided by L3-L4 if the website runs their own geolocation infrastructure (e.g., deploys their own verifier servers), but not by L2 (IP address tabulation) which typically rely on a third-party service provider, and partially by L1 since GPS does not require a third-party service whereas WPS may. None of L1-L4 are fully No-False-Accepts, since other users (both legitimate users and attackers) could be residing near the legitimate user, and thus could be indistinguishable to the server. They are not Resilient-to-Targeted-Impersonation, since they are susceptible to targeted colocation attacks. They are not Requiring-Explicit-Consent, since they are invisible to the user-a GPS/WPS location request may trigger a browser permission prompt to the user, but if the user allows the browser to remember the preference, no future prompts are displayed. They are all partially Unlinkable, since leaking server-stored user location information may narrow the search space for linking together multiple accounts across websites (the attacker may still need to collect additional information).
4.2.
3. Device fingerprinting.. FP1-FP6 deliver most usability benefits, since they are invisible to the user. However, as significant changes in the device configuration (e.g., software or hardware upgrade) may substantially change a device fingerprint, they do not provide No-False-Rejects. They lack Easy-Recovery-from-Loss, since loss of the device requires falling back to an alternative (likely less usable) authentication mechanism. They are not Easy-to-Change-Credentials, since changing a device fingerprint may require the user to obtain a different device.
For deployability, device fingerprinting schemes are Accessible, since they do not require any explicit user action. They are Negligible-Cost-Per-User, since the cost of implementation is essentially independent of the number of users. They are not Server-Compatible, as server-side implementation is required, but are BrowserCompatible. As device fingerprinting has been used for anti-fraud applications [42] , [43] , but not widely for user authentication, we consider FP1, FP2, FP5, and FP6 partially Mature; FP3 and FP4 are not, as they have been demonstrated academically but are not used in practice to our knowledge. FP1-FP6 are generally available via Non-Proprietary implementations.
Many of the security properties are shared across FP1-FP6. They lack No-False-Accepts, since users that own identical devices (or share the same device) may be indistinguishable from each other (and for techniques such as clockskew, the overall credential space is not large enough to rule out collisions). They lack Resilient-to-Unthrottled-Guessing-Attempts, since none of the data collected thus far to our knowledge indicates that the overall distribution of device fingerprints would offer distinguishability of more than about 30 bits [7] , [12] , [33] , [44] , [45] , [46] . They lack Resilient-to-InternalObservation and Resilient-to-Phishing, since an attacker may collect device information by running their own device fingerprinting scripts via XSS attacks or phishing websites.
9 They lack Resilient-to-Leaks-from-OtherVerifiers, since a user's device fingerprint will be similar across websites (varying only based on the particular fingerprinting techniques that each website uses, and the method of storage used), thereby leaking information that can be used to attack users' accounts on different websites. They are each individually partially Unlinkable since there may well be multiple users with colliding device fingerprints-the likelihood of this may diminish substantially when combining multiple techniques, however. Requiring-Explicit-Consent is not provided, since device fingerprinting is invisible to the user.
The remaining security properties differ across FP1-FP6, as follows. FP3 and FP4 are Resilient-to-PhysicalObservation and Resilient-to-Targeted-Impersonation, since they rely on device-specific manufacturing variations (even across devices of the same model) and therefore can only be determined via measurement; the remaining schemes only partially fulfill these properties since an attacker that visually observes a user's device may obtain or mimic the same device model. FP1 and FP2 have been shown to provide enough distinguishing information to provide Resilient-to-Throttled-GuessingAttempts-to our knowledge the remainder have not, but may collectively provide it if combined together [33] .
OTP Schemes. For usability, OTP1-OTP4 are
Memorywise-Effortless since they do not require the user to memorize anything; they are Scalable-for-Users since they allow the user to set up multiple accounts without impacting usability. OTP4 (e-mail) is Nothingto-Carry, since the user just needs to be able to access their e-mail account, whereas OTP1 (mobile app) and OTP3 (SMS) are partially Nothing-to-Carry, assuming users are typically in possession of their mobile phones at all times; OTP2 (USB token) does not fulfill this property. All schemes are Easy-to-Learn, but Inefficientto-Use since they require the user to type an extra code. They all provide Infrequent-Errors since typos are 9. Collecting device information helps the attacker, but alone is not enough to defeat mimicry-resistant schemes such as L4. 
Evaluation of Combined Schemes
The evaluation above shows that schemes that have some degree of mimicry resistance have the potential to augment passwords as they add a new security dimension; invisible schemes such as device fingerprinting and geolocation do so without further burdening users. None of these schemes however seem suitable for use as a user-to-web authentication by itself because either the invisibility aspect makes them limited to device-to-web authentication (see Section 2), or their security space is so small that they lack the ability to uniquely identify users (e.g., suffer from false accepts). This motivates exploring the resultant benefits when these schemes are combined with passwords as a two-element authentication (see Section 2). This is also useful since some password usability drawbacks might be ameliorated in the medium to long-term by use of browser-based and/or stand-alone password managers.
When combining two authentication schemes, both sets of credentials should be correct for the user to gain access. Ideally, the implementation should limit any partial feedback of use to an attacker using a divide-andconquer strategy to independently defeat each scheme individually. For example, if the correct password is provided but the supporting invisible scheme fails, the server can immediately fall back to a backup scheme such as e-mail OTP. 10 In the event of an attack, this serves to notify the user that their password has been compromised; otherwise, it gives the user an opportunity to reset their supporting authentication mechanism (e.g., by registering a new location or new device).
In Table 2 , a combined authentication scheme as described above inherits the union of the security benefits (except for No-Trusted-Third-Party), but only the intersection of the usability and deployability benefits.
The bottom half of Table 2 evaluates the schemes from the top half when used in combination with passwords. The evaluation suggests that either geolocation or device fingerprinting can be combined with passwords to improve security properties, namely Resilient-to-Physical-Observation, Resilient-toThrottled-Guessing, Short-Lived-Credential, Resilientto-Replay, and/or Resilient-to-Spoofing. To further improve security, geolocation can be combined with one or more device fingerprinting schemes. Selecting schemes that maximize the resulting benefits gains the most, e.g., by combining L4 with FP2 and/or FP4. As a downside, this would increase the probability of false rejects, assuming the failure of any scheme causes authentication failure. PUFs provide many security benefits, suggesting that they could be sufficient as a sole authentication mechanism. However, their major drawback is that they lack most deployability benefits (in the web authentication context).
The usability drawbacks observed for the combined schemes in Table 2 
Concluding Remarks
To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to systematically investigate the mimicry aspect of userto-web and device-to-web (versus user-to-device) authentication schemes. The segmentation of the mimicryresistance dimension into levels of replayability and spoofability helps differentiate the ability of various schemes to resist mimicry attacks. Evaluating schemes using the new dimension, we found that most web authentication schemes have limited to no mimicry resistance as they rely fundamentally on some element of secrecy which, once exposed, gives the attacker direct access.
To construct a comprehensive evaluation framework, we combine the mimicry-resistance and exposureresistance dimensions; the latter evaluates schemes by their ability to protect the element of secrecy. Plotting these orthogonal dimensions (Fig.2) results in a novel representation of attack scalability, where a scheme's ability to resist scalable attacks is conveyed by its distance from the origin. The framework thus allows for a comprehensive evaluation of web authentication schemes by their ability to resist both exposure and mimicry, and helps visualize relative resistance to attack scalability, represented as a function of both components. Positioning many representative web authentication schemes on the 2D chart highlights that none occupy the top-right corner (most resistant to scalable attacks).
Using the framework to explore techniques that offer some resistance to mimicry, we find the following four approaches: spoof-resistant device fingerprinting, certain variations of Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs), robust Internet geolocation methods, and some OTPbased schemes. One tenacious obstacle in reinforcing password authentication with additional schemes is doing so without deployability or usability penalties [2] . To evaluate the benefits of combining these four approaches with passwords, we augment (Section 4) the UDS framework with new usability and security properties that reflect the mimicry component. Upon using the augmented UDS framework (Table 2) to evaluate the resultant combined schemes, we found that invisible techniques, those neither requiring user involvement at set-up nor at login times such as geolocation and device fingerprinting, offer substantial usability advantages and are relatively better at deployability compared to PUFs and OTP-based schemes.
Our work highlights the advantages of utilizing mimicry-resistant techniques in web authentication, hopefully motivating further exploration into invisible and mimicry-resistant techniques, and opening the door for constructive evaluation of schemes that resist scalable attacks in particular.
